[Research] Why QRNG Confuses PQC A Clear Understanding and Prioritization of Quantum Security Technologies

Why QRNG Confuses PQC A Clear Understanding and Prioritization of Quantum Security Technologies_20260119_EN.pdf

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Abstract

Why QRNG Confuses PQC: Clarifying Priorities in Quantum Security Technologies

As quantum computing advances toward practical capability, organizations are accelerating investments under the broad label of “quantum security.” However, this term is increasingly used to describe fundamentally different technologies—most notably Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This conceptual ambiguity has led to widespread confusion in technology selection, procurement, and long-term security planning.

This research provides a structured technical and market analysis of why QRNG and PQC are frequently conflated, despite operating at different layers of the cryptographic stack and addressing entirely different threat models. QRNG leverages quantum physical phenomena to improve the quality and unpredictability of random number generation, while PQC consists of cryptographic algorithms designed to remain secure against attacks from large-scale quantum computers, particularly those enabled by Shor’s algorithm.

The study analyzes real-world adoption patterns to illustrate this divergence. Major global technology providers—including Google, Apple, Cloudflare, AWS, and Signal—have prioritized large-scale deployment of PQC following the publication of NIST standards in 2024, focusing on key exchange, digital signatures, and long-term data protection.

In contrast, QRNG adoption—led by vendors such as ID Quantique, QuintessenceLabs, and selective implementations by Samsung Electronics—is concentrated in high-assurance environments where provable physical randomness is required, such as defense, gaming, lottery systems, and specialized financial applications.

By mapping QRNG and PQC to distinct layers of the cryptographic system, this report demonstrates that improving randomness (QRNG) does not mitigate vulnerabilities in quantum-broken public-key algorithms, and that adopting QRNG alone does not provide protection against future quantum decryption. The research further identifies structural causes of market confusion, including ambiguous marketing terminology, fragmented standardization tracks, and procurement specifications that fail to distinguish between entropy generation and cryptographic resilience.

Finally, this paper proposes a practical decision framework for security leaders and policymakers. The framework emphasizes PQC as the primary and essential countermeasure against quantum computing threats, while positioning QRNG as a complementary technology to be evaluated based on specific operational and regulatory requirements. By clarifying these priorities, organizations can avoid false confidence, reduce misallocated investment, and establish a more resilient and future-proof quantum security roadma